In nuclear war fighting the United States maintains a counterforce strategy, aiming our nuclear weapons at an adversaries missile silos, command and control centers and other military infrastructure, with the purpose of destroying their nuclear capabilities before they can be used. In recent years there has been a debate within U.S. policy circles about adopting a “No First Use Policy,” which would state that the U.S. would only use nuclear weapons in retaliation, not as a first strike. Right now, the U.S. does not endorse a first use policy, but does not rule it out, depending on the situation.
The sitting U.S. President has sole authority to order the launch of nuclear weapons. The President is briefed by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but the decision to launch is solely the President’s, after authenticating identity and authority with a special code, referred to as the nuclear football. The order is then executed by those in the nuclear chain of command, such as submarine commanders, bomber crews or missile silo operators. There are no checks or balances in place that can override the President’s decision to launch nuclear weapons once the decision has been made. A formal declaration of war has not been required for the President of the United States to order the use of nuclear weapons, an authority based on the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces and is intended for rapid response in extreme situations. Meanwhile our U.S. Constitution still grants Congress the sole power to declare war.
Today as many as 450 nuclear missiles could be launched from their silos in less than five minutes after the President gives the order. In a situation with North Korea two submarines on launch-ready patrol in the Pacific would fire 200 missiles in 15 minutes. Bombers on full alert with ordnance loaded would require 8 hours to fly from their U.S. Bases to deliver around 500 gravity bombs and cruise missiles. This has led to debates about the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual and to discussions about the need for additional safeguards against imprudent or impulsive unrestrained action. The risk of mistaken launch on false warning continues to be significant concern, adding to the pressure to pre-empt an imminent attack. The cause for launching on warning is a belief that silo-based missiles must be used or lost.
Two conclusions must follow: 1. When silo-based missiles are lost to an enemy first strike, so are lost the surrounding and downwind population of Montana, and 2. In the absence of a formal Declaration of War by Congress, the U.S. must adopt and communicate a policy of No First Use.
Left unchanged our present U.S. nuclear war-fighting posture invites a preemptive nuclear first strike on our 150 nuclear missiles and the Montanans surrounding them in House District 2.
I will always work to ensure U.S. nuclear weapons are never used in a first strike without there first being a Congressional Declaration of War against the targeted nation.
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